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Creating a framework for a Single European
Sky—The opportunity cost of reorganising
European airspace
Niall Neligan*

B.L.

The object of this article is to critically evaluate the legal framework
for a European Single Sky project in light of the recent European
Court of Justice decision in International Air Transport Association
v The Department of Transport. The article will examine in detail
the framework regulations outlining the major provisions from the
recommendations of the Commission's High Level Group in 2000,
to the implementation at a micro-level by national authorities of the
legislation adopted in 2004. Furthermore, this article will examine
whether the savings to air service providers from the Single
European Sky project in the long term will be negated by the short
term outgoings associated with compensating passengers in the
event of delays, cancellations and denied boardings caused by nonsystemic factors.

Introduction
One of the major objectives of the European project since its
inception has been the liberalisation of markets, the free movement
of peoples, goods and services, and the creation of transnational
regulations aimed at harmonising diverse national interests; nowhere
is this more evident in recent years than in the area of air transport,
where the European Commission has taken the initiative in creating
a framework for a Single European Sky as well as affording greater
protection for passengers in the event of delayed and cancelled
flights.
In the recent decision of International Air Transport Association and
others v The Department of Transport ,1 the Court of Justice
confirmed the validity of Community legislation on air passengers'
rights following the introduction of Regulation 261/2004. The
Regulation affords passengers greater protection in the event of
denied boarding, flight cancellation or long delays.2 During the
course of the case, the IATA and ELFFA argued not unreasonably
that airlines will be held responsible for delays over which they may

have no control, such as air traffic congestion, adverse weather and
industrial action taken at different airports.
The inevitable cost burden to airlines will no doubt switch focus
back to the Commission's attempts to reduce delay by creating a
framework for a Single European Sky.3 The Single European Sky
project is the much lauded Community initiative to streamline the
management of European airspace and thus create a more efficient
system for air navigation.4
Globalisation of markets, the availability of budget airlines and the
greater mobility of migrant workers and tourists have placed
enormous demands on European aviation infrastructure.5 Presently,
European airspace is the most congested in the world; in the last
seven years aviation traffic in Europe has grown by 15 per cent, and
is set to grow further; this has an adverse effect on route traffic
resulting in delayed flights.6
There are several reasons why European airspace is so congested;
historically, individual States have been responsible for air traffic
management, thus giving rise to a fragmented system based on
national interest.7 In turn, this has had a knock-on effect on route
management resulting in inefficient use of available airspace.8 Allied
to this problem is the need to use airspace for military purposes,
consequently air-routes have to be managed on an ongoing basis.9
This inefficient use of airspace has resulted in traffic convergence
and occasionally gridlock on fixed route networks prolonging flight
times and causing delay.10
In 2000, the Commission established a High Level Group to
examine the possibility of creating a SES network.11 The
recommendations made in their report became a central plank in the
Commission's White Paper on Transport.12 The High Level Group
made a number of recommendations under eight headings, principal
among which was the establishment of a legal framework for
bringing about a Single European Sky.13 In order to achieve this
objective, the group recommended that the EU institutions should
take the lead in defining high-level rules and ensuring compliance
across the Member States.14 Furthermore, the group recommended
improved co-operation between civil and military agencies for the
development and enforcement of Community regulation and

increased co-operation with Eurocontrol with eventual accession to
that organisation.15

Regulatory framework
Arising out of the recommendations of the High Level Group, a
follow up communication was issued by the Commission in 2001.16
The purpose of this communication was to set out an action
programme in response to the report of the High Level Group;
defining the objectives and the working methods for the reform of
air traffic management in Europe. This Communication was
augmented by a further communication dealing with concrete
proposals for the specific areas of the action programme.17 The
proposals were put to the Parliament and the Member States reached
agreement on them in December 2003.18
Four separate Regulations entered into force on April 20, 2004:
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.
.
.

• Regulation 549/2004 (“The Framework Regulation”)19 ;
• Regulation 550/2004 (“The Service Provision Regulation”)20 ;
• Regulation 551/2004 (“The Airspace Regulation”)21 ; and
• Regulation 552/2004 (“The Interoperability Regulation”).22
The Framework Regulation
The Framework Regulation as its name suggests, creates the
structure for the Single European Sky project with its principal
objectives being the creation of a more efficient integrated airspace,
enhanced safety standards and the promotion of overall efficiency
for general air traffic management.23 One of the criticisms of the
Framework Regulation, however, is that it proposes a bottom-up
approach to air traffic management; rather than the creation of a panEuropean system24 . From a political perspective this would appear
to be the most expedient method for bringing about the Single
European Sky project, however on a practical level it is cumbersome
and over dependent on its implementation by the various Member
States.

Under the Regulation, Member States are required to either
nominate or establish national supervisory authorities to assume
tasks relating to the SES project.25 Those designated national
authorities shall in accordance with the Regulation be independent
of air navigation service providers, and exercise their powers in an
impartial and transparent manner.26 Each Member State is required
to nominate two representatives to join the Single European Sky
Committee; the object of which is to assist the Commission in
pursuing its objectives and to meet the needs and interests of all
categories of users, both civil and military.27 The committee will be
consulted by the Commission on an ongoing basis regarding the
implementation rules and on non-legislative initiatives, and will
make decisions based on qualified majority voting.28
To further assist the committee in reaching its decisions, the
Regulation provides for the establishment of an “industry
consultation body”.29 The creation of this body was one of the
central recommendations of the High Level Group, and its role is to
advise the Commission on the technical aspects of the
implementation of the Single European Sky.30

Implementing rules
In order to implement the rules outlined under Art.3 which come
within the remit of Eurocontrol, the Commission can issue mandates
to that body setting out the tasks to be performed and the timetable
for completion. Article 8(3) provides that if Eurocontrol is not in a
position to accept a mandate, or the Commission concludes that the
work pursuant to a mandate is unsatisfactory, untimely or inadequate
then the Commission reserves for itself the power to adopt
alternative measures to achieve those objectives.31
Inevitably because the Regulation relies on the designated national
authorities to implement the SES project, the Regulation provides
for sanctions against airspace users and service providers which can
be taken at a domestic level, and those sanctions must be
proportional and dissuasive.32 However, the implementation of the
Regulation will be lessened by ongoing consultation at domestic
level with stakeholders, in theory this should reduce the likelihood

of sanctions for non-compliance.
The Regulation would appear to provide two methods for
communicating with interested stakeholders, one at Community
level and another locally driven by national authorities; whether this
development will prove satisfactory in the long term is another
matter. It is fair to argue that if the object of the SES initiative is to
create a more efficient use of airspace, the existence of parallel
bodies is a cause for concern. Inevitably the creation of an additional
level of bureaucracy may stymie the quick progression and
implementation of the project. That said; the Regulation has
provided a mechanism for reviewing performance, drawing upon the
expertise of Eurocontrol in the examination and evaluation of air
navigation.
Article 11(2) provides, inter alia:
“(A) Allowing the comparison and improvement of air navigation
service provision;
(b) Assisting air navigation service providers to deliver the required
services;
(c) Improving the consultation process between airspace users, air
navigation service providers and airports;
(d) Allowing the identification and the promotion of best practice,
including improved safety, efficiency and capacity.”
Article 12 requires national authorities to submit annual reports for
the purpose of allowing the Commission to review the application of
the Regulation and in turn report its findings to the Parliament and
the Council.33 Reports shall contain an evaluation of results achieved
and provide detailed analysis of developments in the sector in light
of the original objectives.

The Service Provision Regulation

The principal objective of the Service Provision Regulation
(Regulation 550/2004) is to ensure that common standards for the
provision of air navigation services are applied across the EU.34
Traditionally, air navigation services have been looked after by
individual Member States, giving rise to disparities in terms of
organisation, training and equipment.35 At the heart of the SES
project is the creation of what are known as Functional Airspace
Blocks (FABs).36 A Functional Airspace Block is an area of which
comes into being according to operational requirements, reflecting
the need to ensure more integrated management of airspace
regardless of existing boundaries.37 Under the SES project, a FAB
can cover the airspace of a number of Member States; the traditional
method of operation according to national boundaries will no longer
be an option, consequently air navigation providers will have to act
in conjunction, according to common structures and procedures.
Given that the object of the SES project is not to create a panEuropean organisation, the monitoring of safety and the provision of
efficient air navigation services has been left to individual Member
States providing their practices comply with the objectives of the
Commission.38

Parameters
The Service Provision Regulation is broken down into four chapters;
dealing with general requirements, common requirements, charging
schemes, and final provisions.
National authorities shall supervise the application of the
Regulation, through inspection and survey to ensure compliance and
maintenance of safe and efficient air navigation services. This
supervisory capacity arises out of the Framework Regulation which
provides for clear delineation between regulatory bodies on the one
hand and air navigation services on the other.
Where FABs transcend national boundaries, national authorities
shall conclude agreements between themselves as to how that
particular block is supervised.39

One of the principal aims of the Air Service Regulation is to create a
system for certifying air navigation service providers, defining their
rights and obligations to ensure overall compliance with the SES
project.40 This entails that all services provided to general air traffic,
be it meteorological, communication, surveillance, navigation and
aeronautical must be certified by respective national authorities.41 A
certificate may be issued to an air navigation service provider in
respect of a single service offered or a bundle of services depending
on their individual requirements.
Certificates may only be issued to air navigation service providers
on condition that certain common requirements, which are listed
under Art.6 of the Regulation, are met.42
In May 2004, the European Commission after some consultation
produced a draft Regulation on common requirements. Following a
further period of consultation, Regulation 2196/2005 came into force
on December 20, 2005. This provision deals with the granting of
certificates, derogations, and compliance.43
The certification system is based on the premise of mutual
recognition across Member States allowing for transnational
provision of services and co-operation between service providers.
The Regulation equips national authorities with the right to oversee
and monitor compliance with common requirements; where there
has been a failure to abide by the terms set out on the certificate,
appropriate measures can be taken against the offending air
navigation service provider including revocation of the certificate
itself.
The onus of proving compliance lies with the air navigation service
provider for the duration of the validity of the certificate. However,
to ensure compliance it is proposed to establish a regular system of
inspection by the national authority; inspection can be carried out by
personnel from the national authority or by a recognised
organisation acting on their behalf.44 National authorities themselves
will also be subject to ongoing peer review by a team comprising of
experts from at least three different Member States, and the review
shall cover all aspects of the common requirements listed in
Regulation 550/2004.

In addition to certification, the Service Air Regulation provides for
the establishment of a scheme of common air navigation charges that
will contribute to the achievement of greater transparency with
respect to the determination, imposition and enforcement of charges
to airspace users, in order to improve the overall ATM system's
efficiency.45
Currently, users pay for the different air navigation services. This
applies whether they are on the ground or in mid-flight. Such
services have traditionally been controlled by local monopolies;
consequently, different charging schemes are in force across the
Member States. Given the purpose of the SES project is the
harmonisation of services, it follows that charges should be applied
in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner across the
community.46 Needless to say, the harmonisation of charges is
dependent on system convergence envisaged within the meaning of
the Interoperability Regulation; as to how quickly this takes place, is
purely a matter of speculation.47

The Airspace Regulation
Whereas the Framework Regulation takes a structural approach to
creating the Single European Sky, and the Air Service Regulation
provides for standardisation of air navigation services, the Airspace
Regulation takes a systemic approach, dealing with the organisation
and use of airspace. In that regard it is fair to say that the Airspace
Regulation from a functional perspective is arguably the most
important of the legislative provisions introduced by the
Commission in 2004.48
At the heart of the Airspace Regulation is the flexible use of existing
airspace and the necessity to optimise it during peak periods to
promote overall efficiency and reduce sub-optimal use. In order to
achieve these efficiencies the Regulation provides for
reconfiguration of airspace based on operational requirements.49 The
Regulation provides for the creation of the aforementioned FABs to
be established by mutual agreement between Member States whose

airspace is included within the proposed area.50 To date, however,
none of these FABs have been created despite the fact the legislation
was initiated almost two years ago.51 It is hoped that when the
proposed FABs are up and running, this will result in the optimum
use of air traffic routes, thus reducing delays and costs.52 However,
airlines have been highly critical of the approach taken by the
Commission in allowing Member States to create FABs, and would
have preferred if a top-down approach had been taken instead.53
Their criticisms centre on the belief that not all Member States are
complying with the SES project.54 Recently the Commission
criticised Greece for non-compliance in failing to create a national
authority and provide for certification of air navigation services.55

The Interoperability Regulation
To create the systemic reorganisation of European airspace
envisaged under the Airspace Regulation, it is necessary to develop
and implement common technical specifications for the European
Air Traffic Management Network (“EATMN”).56 Regulation
552/2004 proposes the introduction of new systems and equipment
that will enable interoperability, co-ordination and co-operation
across the SES area.57 The Regulation proposes the creation of
Community-wide specifications to ensure compliance; systems will
be subject to verification by an air navigation service provider who
must submit a declaration of compliance with the national
supervisory authority.58

Passenger rights and the SES Project
The inevitable consequence of air traffic congestion results in
delays, cancellations, and in some cases denied boardings where
connections have not been met in a timely and efficient manner. The
inefficiencies of the current system have impacted not only on air
service providers, but more importantly on consumers. While it is
not possible to blame all delays, cancellations and missed
connections on air navigation service providers, the fragmented
system in existence is a contributory factor.

The SES project should theoretically reduce some of the
unnecessary delays caused to passengers and airlines arising out of
inefficient use of airspace. However, critics of Regulation 261/2004
have a fair point when they say they will be penalised for delays
over which they may have no control, such as air traffic congestion,
adverse weather, industrial action, safety concerns, and the
behaviour of passengers themselves.
Indeed, it is fair to say that a modified version of the Regulation
could have been introduced pending the completion of the SES
project. Nevertheless, the Regulation does not preclude operating air
carriers from seeking compensation from any person or third party in
situations where the delay or cancellation is caused by extraordinary
circumstances beyond the airlines control.59
In the case of The I.A.T.A. and ors v The Department of Transport,
the High Court referred eight questions to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling.60
Principal among the questions asked was whether Art.6 of
Regulation 261/2004 conflicted with certain provisions under the
Montreal Convention?61 The Court noted that a delay arising out of
air carriage caused two kinds of damage:
“First, excessive delay will cause damage that is almost identical for
every passenger, redress for which may take the form of
standardised and immediate assistance or care for everybody
concerned, through the provision, for example, of refreshments,
meals and accommodation and of the opportunity to make telephone
calls. Second, passengers are liable to suffer individual damage,
inherent in the reason for travelling, redress for which requires a
case-by-case assessment of the extent of the damage caused and can
consequently only be the subject of compensation granted
subsequently on an individual basis.”62
The Court was of the view that the Convention merely governs
conditions under which a flight is delayed, and where individual
passengers may initiate proceedings for damages.63 Furthermore,
there was nothing within the Convention which could preclude any
other form of intervention by public authorities for the purposes of
redress for damages caused by delay. The Court emphasised that

Art.6 was not inconsistent with the provisions set out in the Montreal
Convention.64
“The Montreal Convention could not therefore prevent the action
taken by the Community legislature to lay down, in exercise of the
powers conferred on the Community in the fields of transport and
consumer protection, the conditions under which damage linked to
the abovementioned inconvenience should be redressed. Since the
assistance and taking care of passengers envisaged by Article 6 of
Regulation No 261/2004 in the event of a long delay to a flight
constitute such standardised and immediate compensatory measures,
they are not among those whose institution is regulated by the
Convention. The system prescribed in Article 6 simply operates at
an earlier stage than the system which results from the Montreal
Convention.”
The Court concluded that the standardised measures provided for
under Art.6 do not prevent passengers from bringing an action for
damages arising out of delay under the provisions of the Montreal
Convention.
This of course necessitates the criticism that whereas the SES project
aims to reduce congestion and delay, any cost saving to the airline
operators may be lost by the application of Art.6 where nonsystemic delays such as meteorological conditions or industrial
action cause delay.

Micro-managing the SES project in Ireland and the UK
The Irish Aviation Authority, which is the designated national
authority in Ireland, controls one of the most important airspace
blocks in the world, namely the European and North Atlantic
interface.65 The IAA and its UK counterpart, the National Air Traffic
Service (“NATS”), are currently examining proposals for the
creation of a joint UK and Irish FAB.66 A high level study was
initiated in 2005 and a report was published in June 2005.67 The
purpose of the study was to examine all areas associated with the
establishment of a functional airspace block, from operational to
regulatory. According to the report, the focus of the study was to

establish whether there was a prima facie case for establishing a
FAB.68 The report sought to address a number of key issues,
principal among which is why the UK and Ireland should consider
creating a joint FAB? The rationale for establishing a joint UK and
Irish FAB is outlined in the report, in so far that:

. 1. Both countries share a long common geographical boundary.
. 2. There is a long history of operational co-operation.
. 3. NATS and the IAA have a shared need to manage North
Atlantic traffic.
. 4. There is a significant degree of overlap between customers.
. 5. There is a history of intergovernmental and regulatory cooperation.
. 6. There are strong institutional similarities between the two.
. 7. Both ANSPs have a similar commercial orientation.
. 8. Common language and shared cultural ties.
Taking those factors into consideration, the report writers suggest
that the UK and Ireland form the ideal partnership for the creation of
the first of Europe's FABs.69

Consultation process
In researching their report, civil and military airspace users were
consulted. Various issues were raised by both groups. Civil
operators were anxious that any benefits arising out of the joint
UK/Ireland FAB are passed onto them; in particular they are hopeful
that there will be fewer flight restrictions caused by military use of
airspace. One of the particular concerns for civil airspace users are
the restrictions imposed by virtue of the North Wales Military
Training Area (MTA). The lack of availability of this area has
traditionally placed restrictions on air traffic between the UK and
Ireland resulting in route diversions. According to the report, the UK
military authorities have proposed to make this area more freely
available to civil aviation in the future, however it has been indicated
that the airspace will be sequestered at short notice, thus negating
any attempts to schedule traffic through this area on an ongoing
basis.70

From a practical perspective, the report notes that whereas the
Airspace Regulation only provides for the creation of a FAB in
upper airspace, the general consensus among ANSPs is that this
should be broadened to include lower airspace as well. Furthermore,
the report recommends including a sizeable area of airspace known
as the Shanwick Oceanic Control Area (“OCA”) which is
technically outside the European Flight Information Region
(“FIR”).71 The report recommends that the proposed FAB should
include the territorial airspace of both countries together with the
Shanwick OCA, an area comprising of 3.4 million km.

Benefits of the proposed UK/Irish FAB
The report identified a number of areas where quantitative and
qualitative benefits would accrue to service providers and users. The
likely benefits considered are both short-term and long-term.72 A
summary of the likely short and long term benefits listed in the
report are reproduced below73 :

.
.
.
.
.

• service quality improvements;
• lower staff overheads;
• joint procurement and maintenance;
• reduced operating costs; and
• greater access to military airspace.
In terms of service quality benefits, the report notes that flight
efficiencies are by no means guaranteed. This of course begs the
question, if flight efficiencies are not guaranteed, then what is the
purpose of creating a FAB? However the report estimates that
approximately 2,000-4,000 flight hours would be saved annually in
Irish airspace alone with an approximate cost saving somewhere in
the region of €10-20 million per annum.74
The cost of implementing a joint UK/Irish FAB is estimated in the
region of €10-15 million, almost equivalent to the estimated flight
hour savings listed above. The report doesn't calculate the annual
operation costs associated with the proposed FAB.

Regulatory issues
The report concludes with the regulatory steps to be taken to make
the proposed FAB a reality; this invariably requires further
engagement between the governments, the regulatory agencies, and
the service providers.75 The major recommendations are summarised
as follows76 :

. 1. The British and Irish governments should notify the commission
.
.
.
.
.

.

of their intention to create a FAB.77
2. The UK government should review whether any legislative
changes are necessary.
3. The Irish government should introduce legislation to reform the
structure of the IAA, so that there are no legal impediments to
joint collaboration with NATs.
4. The regulators should agree to jointly designate both service
providers in their national airspace.
5. They should agree a regulatory framework for the
implementation of common regulatory principles and draw up
a timetable for implementation.
6. In terms of the Charging Directive, both national authorities
should make joint proposals for economic regulation in a
situation where each of the two ANSPs is responsible for
providing services in the airspace covered by each regulator.
7. Consideration should be given by both governments and
regulators to the steps necessary for the development of joint
safety or economic regulatory responsibility.

Conclusion
This article has sought to critically evaluate the SES project from a
macro and micro perspective, asking an important question, namely,
what is the opportunity of cost of the project to airlines, air service
navigation providers, passengers and to the community at large? The

annual cost of European air traffic management is €7 billion per
annum. Airlines hope that the creation of the SES project will reduce
ATM operation costs by as much as 30 per cent. Skeptics point out
that whereas the Commission has provided a framework for the SES,
the bottom-up approach will only delay the project unnecessarily. In
order to test this belief, this article has evaluated the advances made
by the UK/Ireland in creating a FAB to cover their joint airspace.
Whereas significant steps have been made in this particular area,
advances have been slow in the Community in general with one
Member State failing to create a national authority as requested
under the legislative framework.
Furthermore, critics point out that the economic benefits of creating
FABs will not be large initially, but will take time to generate major
cost savings and efficiencies. Indeed, it has been demonstrated
above, that the initial cost of creating the joint UK/Ireland FAB
corresponds with the annual cost to Irish aviation of lost flying hours
which is somewhere in the region of €10-20 million. However, what
the report fails to address is the very real possibility that the
restructuring process in the short to medium term may at least
contribute to greater delay as different Member States attempt to
converge incompatible systems and introduce new technologies.
Moreover, many of the elementary economic issues still need to be
resolved, principal among which is the process of reaching
agreement on single en-route charges for each FAB. It is in this area
that most ANSPs generate a large proportion of their income, and is
likely to prove the greatest bureaucratic hurdle to the expeditious
completion of the SES project.
But where does this leave air service providers and more importantly
the passengers, the very users who the SES project is ultimately
designed to facilitate? From a passenger's perspective the SES
project should theoretically reduce flight delays and cancellations
caused by congestion, and systemic factors.78 However, no amount
of regulation can legislate for non-systemic factors such as adverse
meteorological conditions, industrial action, passenger disturbance,
and indeed acts of terrorism.
Although passengers are likely to be the long term beneficiaries
from the SES project it is by no means certain that air service

providers will accrue the same. The introduction of the Delayed
Flight Regulation is likely to adversely affect the airlines
disproportionately in the short term, particularly budget carriers
whose no frills service operates on the principle of slim profit
margins.
In the meantime, airline operators are concerned that the cost burden
of complying with Regulation 261/2004 will affect their
profitability, and inevitably drive up the price of airfares for
passengers. Perhaps there is some merit in the argument that the
introduction of this later Regulation should have been delayed until
such time as the SES project and FABs in particular become a
reality.
Those arguments aside, the SES project is an ambitious attempt to
streamline the European aviation network and reduce the inordinate
and inexcusable delays associated with congested and fragmented
airspace. As to whether it achieves its lauded objectives is purely a
matter of speculation. What will be interesting to analyse is whether
the development of the project from the ground up will succeed or
whether at some later date the Commission will have to intervene
and direct the implementation from the top down. Perhaps and only
time will tell, whether the true opportunity cost of the SES project is
that the Commission should have taken a top-down approach from
the beginning.
*

[ The author would like to thank Ms Lilian Cassin,
Communications Manager with the Irish Aviation Authority for her
kind assistance. ]
1

[ Case C—344/04 International Air Transport Association and
others v The Department of Transport [2006] E.C.R. The
International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) was founded in
Havana in 1945 and represents 270 members from more than 140
Nations. The European Low Fares Airline Association (“ELFAA”)
was founded in 2003 as an unincorporated association representing
10 airlines from nine countries. ]
2

[ Despite reduced delays to European air traffic, in 2003 it was
estimated that 14.8 million minutes were lost to ATM delays. The
Single European Sky — Implementing Political Commitments (The

European Commission, Directorate General for Energy and
Transport, Brussels, 2004), p.1. ]
3

[ The cost of delays to airlines often exceeds the price paid for enroute services. ]
4

[ Hereinafter referred to as the SES project. ]

5

[ The European Commission estimated that air transport demand
grew by 5-7 per cent up to 2000, leading to a doubling of air traffic
every 12 years. In 1999, the Commission estimated that
approximately 21 per cent of all flights were delayed with an
average delay of 25 minutes. European Commission DirectorateGeneral for Energy and Transport, “Single European Sky” Report
of the High Level Group, November 2000. Some 8.5 million civil
flights were recorded in European Airspace during 2003 which
amounted to 26,000 flights per day. The Single European Sky —
Implementing Political Commitments. The European Commission,
Directorate General for Energy and Transport (Brussels) 2004 ]
6

[ Eurocontrol estimates that air traffic will continue to grow at
approximately 3.7 per cent per annum for the whole of Europe
between 2005-2011. “A vision for European Aviation” Eurocontrol
and ACI Europe Press Conference. Aguado, Victor M. Director
General of Eurocontrol ]
7

[ The European ATM network is operated by a multitude of
National ATM centres that are responsible for controlling air traffic
in their airspace. ]
8

[ In 1997, the EU introduced an open market for air transport
services. Arising out of this, airlines lines licensed by the regulatory
authorities of the Member States are free to operate between
different points within the EU. However, despite the deregulation of
the ATS Air Transport Control (“ATC”), services are still largely
organised according to national boundaries. ]
9

[ Civilian aircraft in traveling from one destination to another
often circumnavigate large areas of airspace which is reserved for
military aircraft. Consequently, a flight from Rome to Amsterdam
will have to change course on several occasions during the flight

rather than fly in a straight line from point of departure to point of
arrival. ]
10

[ Inefficient use of airspace is by no means the only reason for
delay. Operational difficulties often arise owing to incompatibility of
control systems, and staff shortages. In its High Level Group Report
the Commission noted in 2000, that there was a shortfall in the
number of Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs) currently operating across
the EC. ]
11

[ Single European Sky; Report of the High-Level Group.
European Commission (Brussels) November 2000. The High Level
Group was established at the behest of EU Transport Commissioner,
Loyola de Palacio, and comprised representatives from both civilian
and military authorities of the Member States together with
representatives from Switzerland and Norway. The Commission
adopted a Communication in December 1999 on the creation of a
Single European Sky (see Communication of the Commission to the
Council and European Parliament on the creation of a Single
European Sky, COM (1999) 614). ]
12

[ European transport policy for 2010: time to decide (The
European Commission, Brussels, September 12, 2001). The purpose
of the White Paper is to bring about substantial improvements in the
quality and efficiency of transport in Europe. ]
13

[ The recommendations are listed according to eight headings:
regulation, airspace, safety, systems and operations, environment
for air traffic control, social aspects, incentives and timing. ]
14

[ See n.10 above at 21. In terms of airspace management the
report envisaged the creation of a Single European Sky, designed,
regulated and strategically managed at a European level to
facilitate both civil and military aviation. The report further
envisaged non-discriminatory allocation of airspace resources to all
users and the phased introduction of the Single European Sky with
interim provision for no fixed areas of segregation. One of the
principal recommendations was to organise the co-operation of the
various military authorities on an ongoing basis. The method for
achieving this objective is to use the mechanisms established under
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (“CFSP”) (2nd Pillar).

The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the EU in the 1993
Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. A number of
important changes were introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty which
came into force in 1999, and since then there have been numerous
developments in CFSP. It has been agreed to embark on a Common
Security and Defence Policy (“CSDP”) within the overall
framework of the CFSP. ]
15

[ Eurocontrol is an intergovernmental organisation for civil and
military aviation and was established to provide and operate air
traffic management system for the upper airspace of Europe.
Eurocontrol came into being on November 13, 1960, when
representatives from Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the
EUROCONTROL International Convention relating to Co-operation
for the Safety of Air Navigation in Brussels. The Convention entered
into force on March 1, 1963. Currently there are 35 members.
According to its website: “Eurocontrol develops, co-ordinates and
plans for implementation of short, medium and long-term panEuropean air traffic management strategies and their associated
action plans in a collective effort involving national authorities, air
navigation service providers, civil and military airspace users,
airports, industry, professional organisations and relevant
European institutions”. Ireland joined Eurocontrol on January 1,
1965, five years after the UK. The EU signed a protocol of accession
to Eurocontrol on October 8, 2002, and the protocol is being
provisionally applied pending its ratification by all the Member
States. It was hoped that ratification would be concluded towards
the end of 2005 when all Member States would lodge their
instruments of ratification simultaneously. At the time of writing, the
Irish Government has recently introduced the Air Navigation
(Eurocontrol) Bill 2005 to implement the provisions of the revised
Convention. Eurocontrol took the initiative during the 1980s and
1990s in trying to improve air traffic management; however, despite
introducing a revised Convention in June 1997 enabling it to adopt
some regulatory responsibilities, ultimately Eurocontrol was not
able
to
act
as
a
fully
fledged
regulator.
See,
http://www.eurocontrol.int/corporate/public/standard_page/org_our
organisation.html. ]
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[ COM (2001) 123 final/2. Action programme on the creation of
the Single European Sky (The Commission, Brussels, November 30,
2001). The purpose of this communication was to set out an action
programme in response to the report of the High Level Group. ]
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[ COM (2001) 564 final/2. ]

18

[ The Single European Sky — Implementing Political
Commitments (The Commission, Brussels, 2004). ]
19

[ March 10, 2004. Hereinafter referred to as “The Framework
Regulation”. ]
20

[ March 10, 2004. Hereinafter referred to as “The Service
Provision Regulation”. ]
21

[ March 10, 2004. Hereinafter referred to as “The Airspace
Regulation”. ]
22

[ March 10, 2004. Hereinafter referred to as “The
Interoperability Regulation”. ]
23

[ Air traffic management is defined under Art.2(10) which means
the aggregation of the airborne and ground-based functions (air
traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow
management) required to ensure the safe and efficient movement of
aircraft during all phases of operations. ]
24

[ Although the document provides the framework for the
European Sky, the Commission envisaged that the actual
reorganisation of European airspace would be driven by the
Member States. Article 1(2) makes it clear that the application of the
Framework Regulation is without prejudice to the sovereignty of
each Member State over their airspace and the requirements of each
to maintain public order, security and defence. ]
25

[ In Ireland, the designated body is the Commission for Aviation
Regulation, as opposed to the Irish Aviation Authority which is
responsible for air navigation. ]
26

[ Regulation 549/2004, Art.4(2). ]

27

[ ibid., Art.5(1). ]

28

[ See n.17 above at 2. ]

29

[ The Industry Consultation Body shall comprise of air navigation
service providers, associations of airspace users, airports, the
manufacturing industry and professional staff representative bodies.
]
30

[ See n.26 above, Art.6 ]

31

[ See n.26 above, Art. 8(3)(a)-(b) ]

32

[ ibid., Art.8(4). Airspace users are defined under Art.2(8) as all
aircraft operated as general air traffic. Service providers are not
defined under the Regulation. ]
33

[ According to Art. 12(4), the Commission is due to lodge its first
report to these bodies by April 20, 2007. ]
34

[ See n. 17 above. ]

35

[ An exception to this is the Maastricht Upper Area Control
Centre which covers the Benelux States, and north west Germany. ]
36

[ FABs are intended to serve a number of purposes, namely to
enable air traffic control to operate efficiently; to ensure that each
airspace block is designed to maximise the efficiency of European
airspace as a whole; to minimise the number of times air traffic
control has to be handed over when an aircraft passes from one area
control centre to the next; and to ensure consistency between the
configurations of upper and lower airspace. ]
37

[ See n.18 above at 25. ]

38

[ ibid. at 6. ]

39

[ Regulation 550/2004, Art.(2)(3). ]

40

[ ibid., Art.(7). ]

41

[ There is an exception to this provision. Article 7(1) provides that
Member States may allow provision of air navigation services in all

or part of the airspace under their responsibility without
certification in circumstances where the provider of such services
offers them primarily to aircraft movements other than general air
traffic. In those cases, the Member State concerned shall inform the
Commission and the other Member States of its decision and of the
measures taken to ensure compliance with common requirements. ]
42

[ The common requirements listed under Art.6 are as follows:
technical and operational competence and suitability, systems and
processes for safety and quality management, reporting systems,
quality of services, financial strength, liability and insurance cover,
ownership and organisational structure, including the prevention of
conflicts of interest, human resources, including adequate staffing
plans and security. ]
43

[ It should be noted that common requirements do not cover
military operations and operations within the meaning of Art. 1(2) of
Regulation 549/2004. For a detailed study of the general
requirements for the provision of air navigation services, refer to
Annex 1 of Regulation 2196/2005. ]
44

[ Regulation 2096/2005, Art.(6) & Art.(9). Note, the authorised
persons shall be empowered to perform the following acts: (a) to
examine the relevant records, data, procedures and any other
material relevant to the provision of air navigation services; (b) to
take copies of or extracts from such records, data, procedures and
other material; (c) to ask for an oral explanation on site; (d) to enter
relevant premises, lands or means of transport. Such inspections and
surveys shall be carried out in compliance with the legal provisions
of the Member State in which they are undertaken. ]
45

[ ibid., Art.14. ]

46

[ It should be noted that Regulation 550/2004 provides for an
exemption for certain users such as light aircraft and State aircraft
provided that the cost is not passed onto other users. ]
47

48

[ See n.53 below. ]

[ See n.21 above, Art.1. The objective of this Regulation is to
support the concept of a progressively more integrated operating

airspace within the context of the common transport policy and to
establish common procedures for design, planning and management,
ensuring the efficient and safe performance of air traffic
management. ]
49

[ Presently, airspace can be divided in two between upper and
lower airspace; typically this division takes place at 8,700 metres or
28,500 feet, however, variations can occur. Consequently, aircraft
sometimes must climb or descend as they cross the boundaries
between two Member States. ]
50

[ It has been suggested that all current national boundaries for
upper airspace should be replaced by just six FABs. Aviation Week's
Aviation Daily: Airline Groups criticize slow pace of Single Sky by
Adrian Schofield, February 2, 2006. ]
51

[ Presently, five sets of negotiations are ongoing to introduce
FABs. These talks are between Ireland and the UK, Bulgaria and
Romania, Portugal and Spain, France and Switzerland, and Sweden
and Denmark. ]
52

[ Eurocontrol has estimated that the European Single Sky would
save airlines about €1 Billion (US$1.2 billion) a year in fuel costs
due to more efficient traffic flow. The cost of ATC services would
likely drop by about the same amount, with this saving also passed
on to airlines through lower user fees. ]
53

[ The Commission has indicated that a top-down solution will be
investigated and implemented if FAB development is not
forthcoming within five years. ]
54

[ Aviation Week's Aviation Daily: “‘Single Sky’ Package Doesn't
go far enough, Airlines Say” by Adrian Schofield. ]
55

56

[ European Information Service. December 21, 2005. ]

[ Interoperability is defined under the Framework Regulation as
“a set of functional, technical and operational properties required of
the systems and constituents of the EATMN and of the procedures
for its operation, in order to enable its safe, seamless and efficient
operation. Interoperability is achieved by making the systems and

constituents compliant with the essential requirements.”
Interoperability is crucial because at the moment Eurocontrol
contains 34 member countries that operate 68 ATCCs with 19
hardware systems running 30 programming languages. ]
57

[ The creation of interoperability will no doubt be enhanced by
the creation of the Galileo Satellite navigation system. ]
58

[ Regulation 552/2004, Art.6. ]

59

[ Regulation 261/2004, Art.15. The Montreal Convention limits
the obligations placed on operating air carriers in cases where an
event has been caused by extraordinary circumstances which could
not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures have been
taken. Such circumstances occur in cases of political instability,
meteorological conditions incompatible with the operation of the
flight concerned, security risks, and unexpected flight safety
shortcomings even though all reasonable measures have been taken
by the air carrier concerned to avoid the delay or cancellation. ]
60

[ See n.1 above. (1) Whether Article 6 of Regulation No 261/2004
is invalid on grounds that it is inconsistent with the … Montreal
Convention …, and in particular Articles 19, 22 and 29 [thereof],
and whether this (in conjunction with any other relevant factors)
affects the validity of the Regulation as a whole? ]
61

[ The Montreal Convention, was signed by the EC on December
9, 1999, on the basis of Art.300(2) EC Treaty, and was approved by
Council decision of April 5, 2001, entering into force on June 28,
2004. From that date, according to the Court of Justice, the
provisions of the Convention have, in accordance with settled case
law, been an integral part of the Community legal order (Case
181/73 Haegeman [1974] E.C.R. 449, para.5, and Case 12/86
Demirel [1987] E.C.R. 3719, para.7). It was after that date that, by
decision of July 14, 2004, the High Court of Justice made the
present order for reference in the judicial review proceedings before
it. The provisions referred to were as follows: Article 19-Delay The
carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by
air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall
not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and
its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be

required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them
to take such measures. Article 22 – Limits of Liability in Relation to
Delay, Baggage and Cargo In the case of damage caused by delay
as specified in Article 19 in the carriage of persons, the liability of
the carrier for each passenger is limited to 4 150 Special Drawing
Rights. Article 29 – Basis of Claims In the carriage of passengers,
baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise,
can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of
liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the
question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit
and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive,
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be
recoverable. ]
62

[ See n.1 above at 43. ]

63

[ Article 6 provides, inter alia, that: “1. When an operating air
carrier reasonably expects a flight to be delayed beyond its
scheduled time of departure: (a) for two hours or more in the case of
flights of 1,500 kilometres or less; or (b) for three hours or more in
the case of all intra-Community flights of more than 1,500
kilometres and of all other flights between 1,500 and 3,500
kilometres; or (c) for four hours or more in the case of all flights not
falling under (a) or (b), passengers shall be offered by the operating
air carrier: (i) the assistance specified in Article 9(1)(a) and 9(2);
and (ii) when the reasonably expected time of departure is at least
the day after the time of departure previously announced, the
assistance specified in Article 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(c); and (iii) when the
delay is at least five hours, the assistance specified in Article
8(1)(a). 2. In any event, the assistance shall be offered within the
time-limits set out above with respect to each distance bracket.” ]
64

65

[ See n.1 above at 45. ]

[ Irish Aviation Authority Press Release: November 1, 2004. In
2003, a major agreement on North Atlantic airspace was concluded
between the Irish and UK Departments of Transport. Building on
that agreement, the IAA entered into a significant co-operation pact
with its counterpart, the UK National Air Traffic Services (NATS).
From January 2005, the IAA will provide air traffic control services

in a new 95,000 sq. kms block of airspace — NOTA (Northern
Oceanic Transition Area), off the north-west coast of Ireland.
Control of NOTA extends the IAA's responsibilities to a total
airspace block of some 450,000 sq. kms, the gateway for over 90 per
cent of air traffic between Europe and North America. ]
66

[ NATS and the IAA control approximately 2.2 million flights,
about 14 per cent of the European total. ]
67

[ National Air Traffic Services Press Release, February 1, 2005.
Helios Technology Ltd won a joint NATS/IAA contract to investigate
the creation of a Functional Airspace Block for Ireland and the UK.
Helios reported back to the IAA/NATs in June 2005. The author
would like to thank Ms Lilian Cassin, Communications Manager
with the IAA for her kind assistance in providing me with a copy of
the report. ]
68

[ Study into the issues and options associated with establishing a
functional airspace block in UK and Irish airspace. Solar Alliance /
Helios. Final Report, June 2005. ]
69

[ ibid. at 4. ]

70

[ ibid. at 15. ]

71

[ The report recommends that the proposed FAB should include
the territorial airspace of both countries together with the Shanwick
OCA. ]
72

[ ibid. at 19. ]

73

[ ibid. at 20. ]

74

[ These figures are based on an assumed deviation of
approximately 1-2 per cent improvement in horizontal flight
efficiency on Irish flight hours. The report notes that there was
around 200,000 flight hours in Irish airspace for 2003 at a cost of
€72 per minute. ]
75

[ The report notes that many of the regulatory processes have
already been initiated. ]

76

[ ibid. at 41. ]

77

[ This has already been done, see n.51 above. ]

78

[ For a more detailed discussion of air passenger rights, see
Neligan “Air passenger rights—A new departure in European
aviation law” (2006) 13 C.L.P. 123. ]

